Averon  //  AI Deployment Security Riyadh  ·  Data resident in KSA  ·  NCA-aligned reporting أمن أنظمة الذكاء الاصطناعي
Independent adversarial assurance

Your AI deployment is a privileged user that nobody has reviewed.

LLM assistants, retrieval pipelines over internal data, and agents wired into production tools now hold reach across your estate that no access review has ever covered. Averon tests those systems adversarially before they go live, and holds them under continuous assurance once they do — delivered in-Kingdom, inside your perimeter.

Premise 01
The model is not the boundary.

A control written into a system prompt is a request, not an enforcement point. Anything that must hold under an adversary belongs in the layer between the model and your systems.

Premise 02
Untrusted text is now executable.

Every document, ticket, email and web page your model reads is an instruction channel into your estate. Your ingestion pipeline is an unauthenticated input surface.

Premise 03
Assurance decays in days, not years.

A prompt revision, a new tool registration, a re-indexed corpus, a model version bump. The system you certified in March is not the system running in May.

01 The attack surface

Five classes of failure your application testing programme does not cover.

A conventional penetration test evaluates code paths, authentication and infrastructure. It does not evaluate what happens when a language model is given credentials, memory, and the ability to act. These are the classes Averon tests against — each with defined methodology and reportable evidence.

AVR-PIClass 01

Prompt injection

Direct instruction override, and — more dangerous — indirect injection through content the model retrieves: a PDF in the corpus, a Jira comment, a supplier email, a page fetched at runtime.

Tested against: system prompt integrity, retrieval ingestion, tool-result parsing
AVR-EXClass 02

Exfiltration through the model

Regulated data, PII and credentials leaving the estate inside a completion — via retrieval over-scope, context bleed between sessions, or rendered markdown and callback URLs.

Tested against: corpus scoping, output channels, session isolation, logging
AVR-TAClass 03

Agent tool-access abuse

Chained tool calls that compose into an action no single call authorises. Confused deputy patterns. Unbounded loops against rate-limited internal APIs. Actions taken without a human in the loop.

Tested against: tool registry, argument validation, action budgets, approval gates
AVR-SCClass 04

Model supply chain

Provenance of weights, adapters and embeddings. Third-party plugin and MCP server trust. Inference dependencies pulled from public registries into a production path.

Tested against: artefact provenance, integrity verification, egress from inference hosts
AVR-AZPrimary finding class

Broken authorization between the model and your systems

The highest-severity class we report, and the most consistently present. The AI system authenticates as itself, not as the user asking. Entitlements collapse at the boundary.

See analysis below
02 Primary finding class

Identity collapses at the model boundary.

A retrieval pipeline indexes a corpus using a service account that can read everything. An agent calls an internal API with a token scoped to the application, not to the person who asked. The model sits between a population of users with differentiated entitlements and a set of systems that only ever see one identity.

The result is a universal read primitive. Any user who can address the assistant can, with sufficiently patient phrasing, reach data they were never entitled to. No control is bypassed. No exploit is used. The authorization decision simply was never made.

Why this one matters most

It is invisible to your existing stack. There is no anomalous login, no malformed request, no data-loss signature. Traffic is a well-formed, authenticated API call from a trusted internal service. Your SIEM sees a healthy system. Your regulator will not.

Fig. 01 — Entitlement collapseAVR-AZ
Requesters AI system Systems of record Identity boundary — entitlements end here Retail analyst tier 1 · 4 of 40 corpora Relationship manager tier 2 · own book only External contractor tier 3 · project scope LLM + retrieval + tool executor identity: svc-ai-prod single principal · static token Core banking read: all HR & payroll read: all Legal & case files read: all three entitlement tiers in one privilege level out
Differentiated entitlements terminate at the orchestration layer. Downstream systems observe a single service principal and authorise accordingly. Averon tests for, and reports, the exact delta between what a requester is entitled to and what the system will return to them.
Specimen finding — redactedAVR-PI-02 / AVR-AZ-01
$ averon report --finding AVR-PI-02 --redact client chain · indirect injection retrieval over-scope disclosure [+] payload embedded in vendor-agreement-rev4.pdf, ingested by index rag-prod-02 [+] trigger: benign user question, "summarise our supplier terms" [+] requester entitlement tier: 2 (no HR corpus grant) [!] model returned 142 records from hr.compensation_band [!] retrieval principal svc-rag-prod holds read:* across 40 corpora [!] no per-requester authorization check at retrieval time [-] detections raised: none (SIEM · DLP · CASB all silent) severity CRITICAL exposure personal data, in scope of PDPL mapping NCA ECC 2-2 (identity & access) · 2-7 (data protection) remedy enforce requester identity at retrieval; scope index by grant
03 What a finding looks like

Evidence a regulator will accept, not a risk score.

Every finding we issue is reproducible. It carries the exact input sequence, the observed system response, the identity context under which it occurred, and the control that should have stopped it. Your engineering team can replay it. Your audit function can file it.

  • Deterministic reproduction steps, with the non-deterministic variance bounded and stated.
  • Full chain reconstruction — not an isolated payload, but the path from entry to impact.
  • Identity and entitlement context at every hop of the chain.
  • Detection gap analysis: what your existing stack did and did not see.
  • Control mapping to NCA ECC, SAMA CSF and PDPL obligations, in Arabic and English.
  • Remediation stated as an architectural change, not a prompt patch.
04 Engagements

Before it goes live. And every day after.

Two engagement modes, designed to be run in sequence. The first produces a launch decision your board can sign. The second keeps that decision true as the system changes underneath it.

Mode A — pre-deployment

Adversarial assessment

A time-boxed, full-scope adversarial engagement against the system as it will actually run: real corpus, real tool registry, real identity plumbing. Concludes with a written position on whether the deployment is fit to launch.

Phase 01
Architecture & trust-boundary review
Where does untrusted content enter, and what identity does it inherit?
Phase 02
Adversarial testing
Manual, chained exploitation across all five classes. Arabic and English payloads.
Phase 03
Entitlement differential
Per-persona testing against the entitlement matrix. The delta is the finding.
Phase 04
Reporting & launch position
Executive position, technical findings, control mapping, remediation review.
Mode B — post-deployment

Continuous assurance

A standing programme that re-tests on change and on schedule, so the assurance statement you hold is about the system running today — not the one assessed at launch.

Trigger
Change-driven re-test
Model version, prompt revision, new tool registration, corpus re-index.
Cadence
Scheduled regression
The full prior corpus of successful attacks, replayed against the live system.
Intake
Emerging technique integration
New public and internally-developed techniques folded into your regression set.
Output
Standing assurance statement
A dated, defensible position on control effectiveness, ready for submission.
05 In-Kingdom delivery

The auditor who can be inside the perimeter.

Adversarial testing of an AI system requires access to the corpus, the tool registry, and production-equivalent identity. That is precisely the access a foreign vendor cannot be granted — and the reason this work has not been done.

Residency

Nothing leaves the jurisdiction

Testing infrastructure, evidence storage and reporting remain in-Kingdom. No cross-border transfer of test data, prompts, corpus extracts, or findings. No offshore analyst access at any point in the engagement.

Regulatory

Written for the submission

Findings are mapped to NCA ECC and, for financial institutions, SAMA CSF, with personal-data exposure assessed against PDPL. Reports are drafted in the register used by the people who file them.

Language

Arabic is a test surface

Guardrails trained and evaluated in English fail differently in Arabic. We test in both, including dialectal and mixed-script payloads, and deliver findings in both. بالعربية والإنجليزية

Averon does not sell a model, a platform, or a guardrail product. We have nothing to protect except the accuracy of our findings — which is the only thing an assurance function is worth.

Independence charter — Averon

If it is already live, the assessment is overdue.

Scoping begins with a ninety-minute technical session against your architecture. No commercial commitment, and no material leaves your environment.

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Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
admin@averon.systems